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The ‘Competition of The Market’: “Enter the Elephant!” 
[A Restatement of a Most Perplexing First Amendment Conundrum] 
William Van Alstyne 
 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.  If you have no doubt of your premises or 
your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away 
all opposition.  To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man 
says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either 
your power or your premises.   But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come 
to believe even more than  they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas–that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That 
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
1
                                                                                               
I. What This Short Paper Means to Address 
A. One Illustration: “Enter The Elephant from Stage Left” 
 Suppose a majority of a state legislature concludes that mortality rates could be very 
significantly reduced were all persons other than authorized law officers forbidden to own or 
possess guns.
2
  But suppose also that nearly all members of the legislature are convinced that 
were they now to vote for an overall  “gun prohibition” law, they would be virtually certain to be 
turned out of office in the very next election cycle.  They understand that this would be so, 
because every reliable poll indicates that there would be sufficient outrage over the adoption of 
this kind of law that those promising its prompt repeal would easily defeat any and every 
member of the legislature who had presumed to vote for it, regardless of the district in which he 
or she were running.  So, given this background-- 
 Suppose the legislature, rightly concluding that “the public” is “not yet ready” for “this 
salutary measure,” (i.e., “salutary” in their view though far from “salutary” as the public would 
perceive it--the public is not yet ready, they would resent the law and seek recourse at the polls, 
to change representatives to others better reflecting their views), therefore sensibly concludes 
                                                          
1
 Holmes, J., in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, pin cite  (1919) (emphasis added). 
2
 We do not care, for the purposes we shall be exploring, whether “the legislature” is in fact correct. (Indeed, the 
case is merely made more challenging by supposing that it is not correct, as may well be the case in point of fact.) 
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that at least  until “the public” is “properly educated” on “this subject,” there can be no real 
prospect to secure the enactment of “this salutary law.”   
 But, suppose, too, then, that rather than therefore simply leave the matter to some later 
time (i.e., when the  public may become “properly educated”3), the legislature sees for itself a 
more pro-active, affirmative role, namely, to help thus to “educate”4 “the public”...and to do so in 
just the following way– 
      --By appropriating $50 million as an earmarked sum for the State Department Of  Health and 
Human Services, over and apart from its usual budget, to be spent by the department to enter into 
contracts  awarded in competitive bidding among advertising firms and/or other companies (for 
profit or nonprofit), the awards to be made strictly on the basis of “cost effectiveness” in the 
“success” of the campaign financed to “change the public’s mind.”   
 ---These stipulated most cost-effective techniques will combine: (a) a heavy emphasis on 
the “costs,” “hazards,” “human toll,” etc. of “gun death;” heightened for impact by (b) omitting 
any and all data of a  countervailing character (e.g., deterrent effect on burglaries, or on rapes, 
murders, etc., from actual defensive use plus criminals’ uncertainty of confronting persons 
obviously able to defend themselves;
5
 (c) eliding differences among categories of “fatal” gun use 
(for example, by merging  “suicide” with “homicide” rates, and with lawful self-defense rates as 
well; and (d) the use of high-tech graphics, funereal music, somber voice-over narration–so, in 
the end: to combine the very best of  professional propaganda techniques thus to magnify the 
“social costs” of gun ownership.  Insofar as its proselytizing campaign may succeed, the 
legislature (or more accurately, merely the “prevailing faction” therein), having won the day for 
                                                          
3 “Properly educated” is used here as a term of art.  In this context, it merely means “persuaded to believe certain 
things re private gun ownership rather than other things and thus either to be pleased to have all private ownership of 
guns forbidden, or, at least, persuaded to be essentially indifferent insofar as a legislature would adopt such a law.” 
(“Education” in this context is fungible with “propaganda,” i.e.,  it is solely concerned with  “the effective 
inculcation of such facts or other matter--and only such facts and or other matter to induce  a state of mind consistent 
with a desire to have the legislature forbid the private ownership and any possession of guns.”)   
4
 [See footnote 3 supra, for the stipulated meaning of “educate”!] 
5
 It has been usefully observed, in some of the critical literature, that even certain studies prepared by the Center for 
Disease Control, may engage in this “selective” data practice.  (Appropriate citation to be supplied, on request.) 
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its favored idea, may then proceed to do that which it currently understands it cannot do without 
its members being at once voted out.
6
  
B. Another Illustration:  “Enter The Elephant” from Stage Right.” 
 Suppose a state legislature concludes that “any further labor organization in the state may 
adversely affect the state’s general economy by discouraging capital investment and also by 
driving new companies either to other states or, indeed, to relocate outside the United States.”  
The state currently has a strong “Right to Work” law, i.e., a law disallowing “union” shops.  The 
legislature (or, more exactly, the current prevailing faction) believes this legislation is altogether 
sound.  Nevertheless, recently increased trade union organizational-and-heightened political 
activity in the state is at such a level that members of the state legislature feel under increasing 
pressure to repeal the law, a move that a majority of the legislature believe would be extremely 
unwise. 
 Convinced that repeal of the state “right to work” law would be very “damaging to the 
state’s economy,” and convinced that “the public may not quite understand how capital markets 
operate and how trade union practices can lead to serious abuses” (e.g., the misappropriation of 
members’ dues by union officials and infiltration by organized crime),7 the legislature 
appropriates $50 million to be allocated to the State Department of Resources and Development.  
These earmarked funds are to be spent to enter into contracts with advertising firms that will 
prepare newspaper, billboard, internet, radio and television advertisements.  The aim of all such 
advertisements is to bring to public attention only the negative aspects of trade unions and the 
negative aspects of any repeal of the right to work law.  The purpose, that is, is thus to serve the 
                                                          
6
 –After puzzling through this scenario at “Time 1,” consider also the following plausible sequel to the legislature’s 
successful domestic propaganda campaign–at “Time 2.”  First, assume that the enactment of the statewide “health 
and human services” “information” campaign to have brought about the desired change in the public mind (to favor 
the outlawing of private gun ownership or, at least to have rendered the public indifferent to such a law).  And 
assume, also, that so much being true, it was followed by enactment of the prohibition (as all along the legislature, 
i.e., its dominant faction, had wanted to enact but was too politically fearful to do).  It is now “time 2.”  The 
question arises as to whether additional appropriations of a like kind should continue, shifting merely as the 
“message” would now be one of trumpeting “how important” and “how excellent” the gun-prohibition law is,  all by 
the same technique as before.  The legislature agrees that this would be the “right” thing to do, and so renews its 
generous budgeting of anti-gun propaganda expenditures under state auspices... 
7
 [And possibly influenced, insofar as a larger number of those both in the house and in the senate of the state 
legislature had benefitted from campaign contributions by employers and from various trade associations, than those 
who had benefitted from campaign contributions by workers and from various trade unions, though this is no 
necessary part of our hypothetical case.] 
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public interest as the legislature sees that interest , and to do so expressly by means of this 
specific “educational” program (“educational” indeed!). 
----------------- 
 Now, turning to this second case, is there a First Amendment basis (or any other basis) to 
seek to enjoin the expenditure?  (Who might bring such an action?  Where?  On what theory 
might it be based?  What relief, if any, are they–the plaintiffs (whoever they are)-- entitled to 
receive?  But so, too, we now likewise ask, what of the first case as well?   
 Are the two preceding cases somehow distinguishable, such that, in respect to one, but 
not the other, there may be some solid First Amendment objection?  If so, what might that 
distinction be?  If there is no genuine distinction,
8
 what, then, does one have to say, i.e., about 
the “relevance” of the First Amendment (or of anything else in the Constitution) to either or to 
each?   
 The general question meant to be framed by these alternative scenarios  may quite 
obviously (even if also quite aggressively) be framed just in the following way-- 
      Does the First Amendment permit a political faction not merely to take control
9
 of the  
legislative process when it succeeds through fair and open elections, but to use that control to 
harness the power of government to levy taxes and to finance “government directed 
propaganda,” in respect to the “proper” attitude toward and the “appropriate” disposition of, 
various social, political, and economic issues?
10
  
                                                          
8
 [Is such “distinction” one may propose based on anything  more substantial than a reflection of one’s particular 
bias and preferences, e.g., that one favors unions but hates guns–or vice-versa?]  
9
 Note: “To take control” does not per se imply anything sinister;  rather, as we use the phrase here, it means merely 
“to take control” in the usual, fully expected, democratic sense of being conceded authority to repeal such laws–
whether “spending” measures or “regulatory” measures--as in its view may warrant repeal and, likewise, adopt such 
laws–whether “spending” measures or “regulatory” measures as in its view, may warrant adoption; and thus to set 
the legislative agenda for the states, as a polity, until such time as it–this freely elected majority faction--may lose 
its majority status to others who may then enjoy the same authority, neither more nor less.  
10
 Perhaps a fuller statement of “the” question might include the following related questions (simply as lesser-
included parts): (a) If the First Amendment does not permit this activity, why not, i.e., on what basis does one so 
declare?  (b) If the First Amendment does not foreclose this activity, may it nonetheless place some limits on how 
far it may extend?  (If so, what are those “limits,” and how is one to identify them?) And are there any other 
provisions within the Constitution, besides the First Amendment, that may be of assistance either in “informing” 
these questions or in providing some answers? 
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    ---------------------------- 
 Each of these disparate (yet similar) scenarios surely raises interesting questions.  At first 
blush, however, it would seem fanciful to try to approach either by trying to invoke the First 
Amendment.  After all, while framed in exceptionally strong terms, still the relevant part of the 
First Amendment merely declares that  
Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.... 
The obvious problem is not so much that the First Amendment applies exclusively to “Congress” 
and not to the States.
11
 Rather, the problem is the more perplexing one, namely this: unlike the 
kind of prohibitory  measure addressed in the case containing the quoted excerpt from Justice 
Holmes,
12
 neither of the state “laws” involved in either of these paired cases is, or even appears 
to be, a law “abridging” anyone’s “freedom of speech,” or anyone’s “freedom of the press.”  
 In brief, neither law is “subtractive.” Each is purely “additive,” ie, each is a law that adds 
a government-sponsored voice to the preexisting cacophony of voices, all of which are still 
“freely” allowed, wholly uncensored:   “voices for” and “voices against” gun control, on the one 
hand, and  “voices for” and “voices against” repeal of the right to work law, on the other hand. 
All that we have here is “The government ‘as the speaker’” (not “the government as the 
‘regulator’”) as the distinction is commonly said to be.   
And so, too, I trust, the idea for the title of this essentially reiterative  essay is now quite plain,  
Thus--“Enter the Elephant” (whether from “stage left”13 or from “stage right”14)  with a loud 
                                                          
11
 To be sure, that is surely correct (i.e., that the First Amendment does apply merely to Congress–or at most to the 
national government–possibly including the executive branch and even the courts as well) and it is equally correct 
that the cases we have put have nothing to do with Congress. Rather, each is solely the product of a state legislature 
and does not come from the national government at all. This is not the problem for us, however, for it has been 
settled (at least since 1925) that the substance of this provision in the First Amendment was accepted as an equal 
restriction on state legislatures, i.e., that none of them may presume to “make [a] law...abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press,” any more than Congress may presume to do, in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(in l868).  And, surely, our cases would be just as interesting (perhaps even dramatically more so) were we to pose 
them in terms of equivalent earmarked-for-special-spending domestic propaganda, measures by Congress, and not 
merely as domestic propaganda bills adopted by particular state legislatures.  
12
 See text at note 1 supra. 
13
 (Stage “left” meaning, of course, as in the first (gun ban) case, the political left: the left–of “sad-eyed, 
communitarian, vegan, pacifist “do-gooders” who know nothing of guns, who hate the Second Amendment, and 
who want no one to possess anything more deadly than a dull-edged butter knife,” and who would therefor be happy 
to have the government enter the “market” of competing ideas to side with them...) 
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trumpet, it, the Elephant, may noisily sound according to the disposition of the legislative faction 
that now sits astride the powers of taxation and of spending to proselytize and to try to influence 
what “the people” may be propagandized to believe, and what measures to support or to oppose 
by way of public policy and of law. 
II. 
There has been a fair amount of both book-length, and even much more by way of  
article-length writing,  addressed to this subject.
15
  There is also a  smattering of Supreme Court 
cases and dicta (and of state and lower federal court cases)
 16 
 to have dealt with some aspects of 
it, too. But in the end, they at best offer certain distinctions that may be clarifying, without, 
however, offering any satisfactory certainty in responding to either of the hypotheticals we have 
raised. 
 Finally, but still merely as but a part of this reintroduction to this highly vexing subject–
to try to provoke the reader’s own best thought—I unapologetically submit the following 
fragment of historical comparison for consideration, to suggest, quite forcefully, why this subject 
assuredly deserves one’s serious concern.  It is this vivid recollection: that not the least reason 
for the horrendous “success” of the National Socialist Party in Germany (the “Nazi” Party), as it 
ascended to power and gained momentum in the early nineteen thirties, proceeded from the 
effective propaganda programs of Joseph Goebbels.  In heading the Propaganda Ministry under 
Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels was able to use the “tax-and-spend” authority of the national 
government (of Germany) to monstrously influential domestic effect.
17
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14
 (Stage “right” meaning, of course, as in the second (the right-to-work law) case, the political right:   the right of 
“complacent coupon-clippers who revel in their  unearned wealth advantage as an “accurate” gauge of talent and 
skill, and who are quite  happy to have the government enter the “market” of competing ideas to side with them to 
combat laboring groups.)  
15
 [I omit a string of citations here, to be supplied only on request.] 
16
 [These materials, too, I will supply only on request.  Here, however, I shall  summarize a small number, merely to 
show what they do–but also do not do–to resolve the harder questions implicated in our subject.] 
17
 A mere reading of Goebbels’ diary (as I managed even in my early ‘teens), i.e., his diary, found partly charred 
nearby the bunker where, with  Hitler, his life ended in l945, is well worth a person’s time. It is as depressingly 
impressive as it is altogether cynical in it detail–in preparing propaganda. (Indeed, Goebbels’ insights are widely 
employed today, often, of course, without even realizing, much less ever acknowledging, from whence they may 
have come....) 
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 To be sure, the regime that was that dreadful Nazi regime certainly did not proceed 
merely by entering the “market of ideas” as a vigorous and effective “new speaker” via a 
centrally-run, well-financed, astute, and ideologically-committed “propaganda” ministry.  As its 
particular “ideas” became increasingly “accepted” (as they clearly were when thus so heavily 
sponsored by the government), however, so, too, then, were its measures to suppress dissenting 
voices facilitated as well. (And suppress them it did...to the point of mass extermination...as we 
well know.)  Correspondingly, moreover, I think no serious student of the Nazi era has 
challenged the contributing and major significance of the Nazi government’s systematic  
domestic propaganda programs in the shaping of German attitudes, German beliefs, 
understandings, and fears that made it so feasible to turn ever more harshly, first to suppress 
dissent and finally to “suppress” (i.e., to annihilate) dissenters.   
 But if, indeed, it is the case that whenever a faction fairly captures “a conventional right 
to legislate” because its right to legislate has been validated at the polls, that that merely 
conventional “power” also embraces an authority to stipulate what messages shall be publicly 
financed, prepared under government auspices or at its direction, loosed into the public forum, 
without some discernible, clean, and judicially-enforceable constitutional boundary, it would 
seem both very puzzling and disturbing.  “Puzzling,” surely, if just because one would never 
have imagined that this elephantine “voice” was ever to be an “entry” in the “competition” of 
“the market,” at least not “the” market that Justice Holmes had in mind.18  “Disturbing,” also, 
because of what it may additionally and quite obviously further imply. 
   To be sure, I suppose, one might dismiss the imagery of a “National Ministry of 
‘Propaganda’”19 And the added suggestion of some direct comparison of Joseph Goebbels and of 
the Nazis may–at least for now--be peremptorily dismissed  as odious in the extreme.   Still, so 
                                                          
18
 I.e., a political market wherein whatever party or coalition of parties may gain a voting majority within a 
legislature possessed of general powers to tax and to spend, may:  freely pick a point of view to promote; wrap it in 
the verbal cellophane of “public interest;” and finance its mass promotional dissemination, the better to insure that 
that point of view will hold sway and win out!  
19
 But of course, in the United States, such agencies, even though emphatically employed to purvey obvious 
propaganda, would not be called “propaganda” ministries or “propaganda” agencies (for surely the obtuseness of 
that odious label would be self-defeating and the legislative authors of such proposed agencies most  likely find 
themselves swiftly defeated at the polls. Instead, however, they would be (as they sometimes are) called 
“information services,” or “departments of health advisories,” or departments of continuing “education,” 
or...whatever one’s penchant for mere euphemism may suitably suggest.  (Indeed, in point of fact, “propaganda” is a 
term that Congress has reserved–and  used--to label  material issued  under the auspices of other governments–but 
declined to use to identify any similar material issued under its own auspices.  See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 
465 (1987) (an “informative” example of just this kind of double standard written into a congressional act)).  
8 
 
much being admitted, there have been some
20
 who have presciently cautioned us that phenomena 
of just this sort do not appear all at once, but instead in mere increments, in small installments,  
on easy grades and slippery slopes (just as in either of our hypothetical instances).  
 Indeed, I think it is highly instructive that it was within the very midst of World War II, 
in l943, that Justice Robert Jackson (who subsequently was also to serve as Chief Prosecutor for 
the United States in the Nuremberg trials), penned the following paragraph, likely with the 
conspicuous German example of “propaganda power” well in mind, in invalidating the exercise 
of compulsory flag salutes in state-run public schools: 
“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.***If there be any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein. Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular 
instruction and neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party or faction.  If it 
is to impose any ideological discipline, however, each party or denomination must seek to 
control, or failing that, to weaken the influence of the educational system.***It seems trite but 
necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends 
by avoiding these beginnings.”21 
III. 
It would not be any stretch at all, in my view, to subscribe to Justice Jackson’s salient 
view in Barnette, that no faction, whether by gaining control of a state legislature or, for that 
matter, Congress, may thereupon presume to “harness” the tax-and-spend powers to proselytize 
for some favored idea, so to enter into such ongoing debate as there may be between those lining 
up, say, with Sara Brady, Handgun Control, and other like-minded organizations (and like-
minded individuals) on the one hand, or oppositely with those lining up with the NRA (on the 
other), so to lend its elephantine “weight”--by its willful culling of “facts” presented to promote a 
proselytizing objective, to take sides so to engender or rally more public credence in the views 
held by Handgun Control than in those oppositely entertained by the NRA.
22
 And neither may it 
                                                          
20
See, e.g., SINCLAIR LEWIS, IT CAN’T HAPPEN HERE! (1935). 
21
West Va. Bd of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
22
 That it–the government--might well deem it appropriate to provide  an expanded  public forum, by means of 
providing tax-supported places or otherwise (thus neutrally facilitating the  presentation of contending views), 
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do so in our other case as well, i.e., to harness tax-and-spend powers to invite public hostility to 
unionization, by its “educational” campaign of the kind reviewed above. 
  And, indeed,  in a more recent case (i.e., “more recent,” that is, than the wartime year of 
1943) ,  Justice Hugo Black seemed to come very close to just this view of the matter in the 
following passage:  
 Probably no one would suggest that Congress could, without violating this Amendment 
[i.e., the First Amendment], pass a  law taxing workers, or any persons for that matter (even 
lawyers), to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups favored by the 
government to elect their candidates or promote their controversial causes.  Compelling a man 
by law to pay his money to...advocate laws or doctrines he is against differs only in degree, if at 
all, from compelling him by law to speak for a...cause he is against.
23
 
And so, too, Justice Black went on to repeat this view in still another and later case as 
well: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would be unaffected.  (A suitable example of this easily distinguishable sort is  Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217 (2000) (sustaining compulsory public university student activity fee insofar as all on-campus student 
groups (irrespective of their point of view) were identically eligible for reimbursement of some of their expenses). It 
is also eminently plausible to distinguish government institutions and the use of public funds to contract with private 
institutions, simply to develop and “to contribute information” relevant to contested issues, i.e., to conduct research 
according to the best methods of unbiased inquiry, publishing the material such that it is useful simply to enrich the 
overall “data base” from which others may then draw in arguing pro or con re laws to adopt, to repeal, or to modify.  
(So, for example, studies conducted in research labs either operated by or funded by the E.P.A. simply to attempt a 
better understanding of the relation between, say, “diesel emissions” and “air quality,” than may already be known.)  
(One would carefully contrast these types of endeavors from those defined in ftnote 3 supra, and obviously contrast 
them also with each of the hypothetical legislative scenarios with which we began this review.)  
23
 International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 746, 788 (1969) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).  
Note that in the quotation from Justice Black, the objectionable practice is the use of tax monies “to create a fund to 
be used” in certain ways as such (i.e., that no distinction is made between delivering the money to a favored group 
free to devote it to promote an agenda the legislature also favors, and using the money itself to promote the agenda 
favored by certain groups).  
10 
 
 ...I can think of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the First 
Amendment than to compel persons to support candidates, parties, ideologies, or causes they are 
against.
24
 
 But thus far, essentially, these–and several other--kinds of claims  have had only very 
limited utility in the relevant case law from the Supreme Court.   Indeed, in certain respects, 
moreover, the way in which they have been used successfully may have  (ironically) also served 
just mischieviously to sharpen the distinction between “the elephant” and all others, i.e., cases 
holding, or  at least strongly implying that insofar as the “speech” at issue can, indeed, be 
characterized with “the government” as  “the speaker,” there may be few, if any, First 
Amendment limits or restraints.
25
  And, I think, none so far as I know that have thus far been 
identified either in the case law or in the several books and the many more law review articles 
examining the subject, that would provide any answer to either of the hypothetical cases 
described in the opening paragraphs of this brief review–a principal object of which has been to 
invite help from others, to offer their own observations, critical questions, and their very best 
thoughts.   
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 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 873 (1961) (dissenting opinion). (Justice Black’s views correspond to the 
often-quoted phrases from Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (e.g., Jefferson’s insistence that “...to compel a 
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and 
tyrannical”), and that he (Justice Black) found, within the First Amendment, an “enactment” of that very belief as a 
restriction on what government may not do (i.e., “compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions” he may not share). (Such a proposition holds promise to provide some degree of objection 
in both the cases we have put.) 
25
 I will here take a few of these up now but only to make things reasonably clear.  A good example of a successful 
use of Justice Black’s view may be found in Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (l977) and also in Keller 
v. State Bar of Calif., 496 U.S. 1 (l990). A leading example of the latter (i.e., distinguishing “government” speech), 
however, may be provided by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  And see also United States v. American 
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. ___ (2003) (But see Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)). (The “distinction” has 
also been regarded as crucial in the “forced contribution” government or third-party/generic-food-product 
advertising” cases.  See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, pin cite  (2005) (“[T[he 
Government’s own speech...is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”) (emphasis added), but compare United 
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).) See also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
 (For a more recent case (again) declaring that “government speech...is not subject to scrutiny under the Free 
Speech Clause,” see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125, pin cite (2009).) (But  see Stevens, J. (with 
Justice Ginsburg) dissenting in Pleasant Grove (“To date, our decisions relying on the newly minted government 
speech doctrine to uphold government action have been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit.”) (For reasons 
briefly set forth immediately hereafter, I thoroughly agree with this latter observation of “doubtful “merit indeed.). 
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 Insofar as it may matter (which it assuredly may not) or, at the least, be of some slight 
passing interest, as I hope it may (at least to some), my own strong inclination is to draw directly 
from the compelling observations of Justice Holmes, and likewise from those of Justice Black et 
al., the following proposition: Indeed, the first and fourteenth amendments do “enact” certain  
restrictions on the powers of government bodies, much the same as certain utterly commonplace 
clauses in various corporate charters and bylaws, i.e., clauses limiting the corporate spending 
authority of the board of directors.  Accordingly, just as any shareholder may rightly sue to 
secure judicial assistance to restrain a company in which he or she holds any shares from acting 
ultra vires, so may any citizen do likewise, and merely equivalently, in each of the cases we 
posed.   
Indeed, I believe that to hold otherwise ought not be treated lightly, much less should it 
be extolled as an “appropriate” exercise of judicial restraint.  Rather, to the contrary, it is 
deplorable and it is to be condemned as but a disappointing example of judicial self-abnegation, 
the utter abdication of one’s judicial responsibility and indeed, a violation of one’s judicial oath 
of office as explicitly set forth in Article VI.)   
 But, of course, the reader even now may disagree (?).  If so, then what more can I say? 
Perhaps in sadness, at least this:  
 Dear reader, 
 “Quo vadis?”    
 Sincerely, 
William Van Alstyne                                                                                                                     
May 19, 2014 
 
 
 
 
